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Complementarities between employee involvement and financial participation: do institutional 
context, differing measures, and empirical methods matter?  
 Derek C. Jones, Panu Kalmi, Takao Kato and Mikko Mäkinen 
Abstract: While most studies on complementarities are for the US and the UK, liberal market 
economies, we investigate whether productivity is greater if firms use employee involvement (EI) in 
decision-making and financial participation (FP) practices in tandem in a coordinated market 
economy. Representative data for Finnish manufacturing firms are used. Our diverse specifications 
reflect varying approaches in theoretical and empirical work on complementarities. Using panel data 
and looking at the incidence of various EI and FP practices (the extensive margin), we find next to 
no evidence in support of complementarities. However, we find some evidence for such 
complementarities using cross sectional data (where we control for several covariates that related 
work has found to be important for firm performance), and also when we focus on the intensity of FP 
(the intensive margin). In accounting for differences in empirical findings across varying settings, 
our findings suggest a role for institutional context and that differing measures and empirical 
methods matter. 
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The existence of participatory practices that promote employee involvement in firm decision-making 
(EI) and financial participation (FP) by employees has become increasingly common and often EI 
and FP coexist (e.g. Blasi and Kruse 2006 for the US; Kato 2006 for Japan; Kalmi and Kauhanen 
2008 for Finland). Many expect stronger benefits from EI and FP if firms use participatory practices 
together. This is the complementarity hypothesis. However, some researchers contend that, for 
reasons including adoption costs and information asymmetries, all firms cannot be expected either to 
adopt or benefit equally from similar sets of EI and FP practices (e.g. Bloom and Van Reenen 2011).  
 Much empirical work investigates the economic benefits actually emerging from adopting EI 
and FP practices (Shaw 2009). Furthermore, several investigations find evidence supportive of 
complementarities (e.g. Pendleton and Robinson 2010). However, this is not always true – e.g. 
Cappelli and Neumark (2001) do not uncover evidence of such synergies. Moreover, most previous 
empirical research is based on “liberal market economies” (LMEs) rather than differing institutional 
contexts, including  “coordinated market economies” (CMEs) (Godard 2004). 
 Our key contribution is to present fresh evidence on whether complementarities exist in a 
CME. The institutional characteristics of LMEs and CMEs can be expected to lead to profound 
differences in the economic impact of EI and FP. Indeed we hypothesize that in a CME such as 
Finland with strong traditions of employee participation and industrial democracy, 
complementarities may be weaker than in Anglo-American LMEs. However we also hypothesize 
that, in a mature participatory economy such as Finland, while changes in whether or not a certain 
program is used---the extensive margin--- may be ineffective, what may matter are changes in 
coverage or extent of the program-- the intensive margin. To investigate these hypotheses we 
interrogate new representative survey data for Finnish manufacturing firms.   
Two other contributions reflect our data which permit investigation in a single study of the 
sensitivity of findings to different estimators. Panel data allow for the fixed effects estimator that 
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account for unobserved firm heterogeneity. Our cross-sectional estimations enable controls for 
several covariates that related work has identified as important for firm performance, e.g. product 
market competition, computer use, and family and foreign ownership. Omitting these covariates 
from cross-sectional OLS models, when they are correlated with EI and FP practices and the 
dependent variable (firm performance), produces biased estimates of the included EI or FP variables. 
Second, compared to much previous work, we have information on a broad range of both EI and FP 
practices. This enables us, again within a single study, to investigate diverse ways to capture the 
effects of complementarities.  
Conceptual framework and Empirical Evidence 
 
The theoretical framework that analyzes complementarities has been laid out in several influential 
studies (e.g. Milgrom and Roberts 1995; Ben-Ner and Jones 1995). For Milgrom and Roberts (1995, 
p. 181) a complementarity exists if “doing more of one thing increases the returns to doing (more of) 
the others”. In the context of EI and FP practices, arguably the effects of a single FP and EI practice 
on goal-alignment and human capital accumulation may be stronger, and work in parallel directions, 
when firms use these practices together rather than alone.  
We first consider the effects of individual forms of participation. By linking employee pay 
with firm performance, FP aims to align the interests of the firm and its employees-- a goal-
alignment effect. In turn, EI practices, by reducing asymmetric information between employees and 
managers, may improve goal alignment and facilitate more favorable labor-management relations 
within the firm. Relatedly, voluntary information sharing by employers (e.g. through a joint 
consultation committee) may enhance worker loyalty, cooperative behavior and trust (Kleiner and 
Bouillon 1991). Second, concerning a human-capital effect, FP practices such as profit sharing may 
reduce the probability of worker turnover (e.g. Azfar and Danninger 2001). A longer vesting period 
for human-capital investment, may encourage the formation of firm-specific human capital (Freeman 
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1976; Jones and Kato 1995). In a highly unionized environment, such as Finland, EI practices may 
provide employees with stronger voice in the workplace which, in turn, reduces workers’ voluntary 
exits thus retaining firm-specific human capital.  
Other studies emphasize complementarity mechanisms arising from combinations of EI and 
FP. Weitzman and Kruse (1990) argue that profit sharing, a group-based FP plan, works only when 
the free-riding problem is solved through a long-term commitment of workers achieved through EI. 
Levine and Tyson (1990) argue that cooperative behavior by employees requires financial incentives 
otherwise employees may not gain financially from improved productivity and lose their motivation 
to cooperate. While Ben-Ner and Jones (1995) argue that EI practices implemented without FP 
schemes may lead to increased shirking, Freeman et al. (2010) provide empirical evidence that 
combinations of EI and FP reduce shirking practices. Kato and Morishima (2002) argue that 
representative participation in particular may reduce managerial moral hazard and facilitate trust in 
management, especially when combined with FP. 
  Empirical studies that directly investigate complementarities between EI and FP practices are 
scarce. In their pioneering study on a specific steel production process in 26 plants in the US, 
Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) find support for complementarities among participatory 
practices. Blasi et al. (2015) present evidence for US firms that EI and FP reinforce each other in 
reducing employee turnover, although results concerning profitability are unclear.  For CMEs, Jones, 
Kalmi and Kauhanen (2010) present evidence on complementarities for a Finnish food processing 
firm. For Danish companies, Eriksson (2003) finds some evidence of complementarities between EI 
and group-based financial incentives. Kato and Morishima (2002) uncover evidence of positive 
complementarity effects between systems of participatory practices for Japanese listed firms. 
However, many studies find no or mixed evidence on complementarities. These include many 
studies on the UK, such as  Addison and Belfield (2000), who use the 1998 UK WERS data, 
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Robinson and Wilson (2006) who find little evidence of complementarities between different forms 
of participation, and Sengupta (2008) who finds that share ownership has a positive impact only on 
productivity but not on profitability when combined with trade unions. Pendleton and Robinson 
(2010) report that EI is needed to overcome free-riding problems associated with employee stock 
ownership plans (ESOP), only if there is minority participation in the ESOP.  Some studies on the 
CMEs also find scant evidence, such as Kalmi et al. (2005) who use a sample of European listed 
firms. Most unusually, when investigating a German steel plant, Frick et al. (2013) find that 
combinations of teamwork and performance-related pay (PRP) are associated with reduced quality, 
increased absenteeism, with no productivity gains. 
From this brief survey, it is clear that no consistent results emerge from empirical studies 
concerning complementarity. Consequently, this paper aims to present fresh evidence on these 
issues. In particular, in investigating whether complementarities exist, we hypothesize that 
institutional context matters. Most prior studies use either UK or US settings that tend to be 
characterized by low trust, low commitment or arm’s length employment relationships. In these 
LMEs, to stimulate employees to work harder and smarter, employers may use combinations of EI 
and FP practices—if used alone, they may have limited impact because of an often-prevailing low-
trust dynamic. By contrast, since CMEs (such as Finland) have completely different industrial 
relations systems compared to those prevailing in Anglo-American countries, our findings might be 
expected to depart from those reported for LMEs. For example, in Finland the overall industrial 
relations climate has been characterized as collaborative and trust-intensive. By international 
standards, the statutory protection of employee rights is robust (Kalmi and Kauhanen 2008) and 
union density is very high (during our observation period well over 70%). Also, Finnish trade unions 
bargain on wages and a large number of workplace issues. Any thoroughgoing organizational 
changes affecting employees, including adopting EI practices such as self-managed teams, have to be 
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discussed with employee representatives. For many FP systems too (e.g. personnel funds), decisions 
are made cooperatively by employer and employee representatives. In such an environment the 
expected effects of EI and FP may be less profound than in Anglo-American LMEs. Because of 
these differences in industrial relations environments, we hypothesize that the complementarity 
effects of EI and FP are likely to be smaller than in Anglo-American LMEs.  
Furthermore we draw on much literature (e.g. Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), Purcell et al. 
(2008)) that argues that the mere presence (adoption) of a human resource management (HRM) 
practice (such as profit sharing) may not be as important as actual implementation (and dimensions 
such as the size, nature and coverage of the profit share). Specifically, in a mature participatory 
economy such as Finland, with strong traditions of employee participation and industrial democracy 
(Kalmi and Kauhanen 2008), our second hypothesis is that what matters most is the coverage of the 
plan and the strength of employee voice in the program rather than whether a certain program is 
used. In other words, we hypothesize that HRM changes on the intensive margin may be more 
important than HRM changes on the extensive margin. 
As well as providing fresh evidence concerning whether complementarities exist in a CME, 
we also respond to two other main reasons for the failure to uncover consistent findings in the 
existing literature -- the use of differing empirical methods (e.g. panel vs cross sectional estimates) 
and different ways to capture the potential impact of EI and FP (e.g. HRM systems vs summary 
indices). By investigating, in a single study, diverse ways to capture complementarities and by using 
diverse estimators we will also shed light on the potential role of differing measures and methods in 
accounting for variation in reported findings concerning complementarities. 
Data and Empirical Strategy 
Data 
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The firm population from which we randomly sample is the 1054 Finnish manufacturing 
companies employing at least 50 persons as listed in Statistics Finland’s Business Register in 
September 2005. We focus on these larger firms because, in smaller firms: (i) EI and FP practices 
might not be common; (ii) respondents may be reluctant to participate in surveys (e.g. for lack of 
time); (iii) financial statements are not as easily available; and (iv) to show comparability with 
previous studies that focus on similar manufacturing firms. A well-known Finnish market research 
firm, operating in the field for over 20 years, conducted the Computer Assisted Telephone 
Interviews.2 Interviewers were specially trained and called firms in a random order and asked the 
firm’s switchboard operator to be connected with: “a manager who is in charge of the firm’s human 
resource management issues in Finland.” If a respondent was busy when called, the interviewers set 
a more convenient survey time with the respondent. Interviewers stressed to respondents that full 
anonymity and confidentiality would be guaranteed. Budget constraints meant that altogether 832 
calls (representing more than 80% of the population)  were made between December 2005 and 
January 2006; eventually 398 firms participated fully in the survey ( 38% of  the population and 
almost 50% of target respondents.) The average running time for an interview was about 30 minutes. 
When our sample is compared with the underlying population, the characteristics of companies are 
very similar in terms of size and industry distributions.  
Our unit of analysis is firms rather than establishments. In an economy in which there are 
many large firms with multiple establishments and their headquarter HRM departments are less 
powerful (such as the US),3 the incidence, nature and scope of EI and FP may well vary significantly 
among establishments within the same firm and the choice of firms as the unit of analysis may be 
problematic. By contrast, for an economy such as Finland, in which there are relatively few large 
                                                 
2 Compared to mail-in or internet-based interviews, telephone interviews are expected to achieve higher reliability and 
improved response rates, are substantially cheaper than on-site interviews and yet generate a large and representative 
sample. 
3 See, for instance, Jacoby et al. (2005).  
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firms with multiple establishments and when many industrial relations issues are negotiated between 
management and unions at the headquarters level, the choice of firms as the unit of analysis poses 
less analytical inconsistency while securing reliable and consistent firm performance data for most 
firms who respond to the survey.4 That being said, we acknowledge the possibility of measurement 
errors caused by heterogeneity in EI and FP among different establishments within the same firm for 
our multi-establishment firms.  
We use labor productivity (firm sales per employee) to measure firm performance since 
employee participation practices aim to enhance labor productivity more directly than overall firm 
productivity. Also, in our empirical work, when we estimate production functions, this is a standard 
procedure (e.g. Kato and Morishima 2002).  
 However, there is no single convention to guide which participatory practices should proxy 
for EI. Our survey instrument draws on recent influential literature (e.g. Chi, Freeman and Kleiner 
2011) and our knowledge of actual Finnish HRM practices.5 For EI we focus on seven practices: 1) 
employee board representation, 2) joint consultation committee, 3) quality circles, 4) self-managed 
teams, 5) job rotation, 6) suggestion schemes, and 7) job satisfaction surveys. We use binary 
measures for the incidence of a single practice (=1 if a firm uses a given practice, 0 otherwise).6   
   
  Our measure of FP includes PRP, personnel fund, broad-based stock option scheme, and 
broad-based share ownership scheme. PRP is broader than just profit-sharing, because the level of 
measured performance can vary and since it does not need to include profitability. However, an 
analysis of the PRP schemes studied in Jones et al. (2012) reveals that they usually (for white-collar, 
                                                 
4 As shown below (Table 2), the average firm employs fewer than 300 employees and about half of sample firms are 
single-establishment firms.  
5 The EI and FP practices for which we collect data are those most evident for Finnish manufacturing firms (e.g. Kalmi 
and Kauhanen 2008). 
6 In constructing a measure of EI our approach resembles that used by many researchers who draw on prominent survey-
based studies such as Britain’s WERS (e.g. Addison and Belfield (2000); Cox et al., 2006). Thus EI differs from broader 
concepts such as HPWS for which measures typically include other elements such as training (see, e.g. Huselid, 1995.) 
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almost always) include profitability as a performance criterion, typically they are broad-based 
(covering at least 50 percent of all employees), and a large majority actually include all employees. 
The PRPs in our sample are group-based incentive schemes, and most can be classified as cash-based 
profit-sharing (following the typology of Poutsma and de Nijs (2003)). While we cannot distinguish 
between selective and broad-based PRPs throughout the sample period, our survey has information 
on the proportion of employees covered by PRP schemes in 2005. Thus, in many of our models we 
include only broad-based PRPs8 in our definition of FP, instead of including also selective schemes.  
Personnel funds are a form of deferred profit-sharing where profit-shares are invested either in the 
sponsoring firm’s stock or more broadly in financial markets. If a company sponsors a personnel 
fund, all employees are covered during their ongoing employment contract, so these are always 
broad-based group incentive schemes. While most stock option schemes in Finland are selective 
(Jones et al. 2006), we include only broad-based stock option schemes here. Similarly, we include 
broad-based share ownership schemes though direct share ownership (other than through personnel 
funds) is uncommon in Finland (Jones et al. 2012). To measure broad-based share ownership and 
stock option schemes, as in previous studies (e.g. Kruse et al. 2010), the proportion of employees is 
at least 50%. 
We obtain data on each EI and FP practice prior to 2005 by asking whether the practice was 
used in 2002. If it was in place in 2002 but not in 2005, we ask when it was terminated; if it existed 
in 2005 but not in 2002, we ask when the practice was started. If it existed both in 2002 and 2005, we 
assume it existed throughout the period.  As with all surveys this strategy may be prone to 
respondent’s recall errors. Since information on these practices is based on one survey and one 
respondent in each firm, our data potentially also suffer from the “single respondent problem” 
(Gerhart et al. 2000). However, using single respondents is good for consistency of information. 
                                                 
8 These account for over 70% of all PRPs. 
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Furthermore, the extent of such problems is apt to be no greater than in studies that rely on multiple 
surveys or which, at least in the past, used managerial responses to gather performance data (e.g. 
WERS). In such cases, the separation of respondents across surveys (at least partially), might 
produce inconsistent reporting and in some cases exacerbate measurement error. We focus on the 
incidence of practices within firms, which we believe produces less “recall measurement error” than 
“participation ratios” for employees in practices, although it yields less information on the actual 
scope of practices. Also, since survey respondents are those most knowledgeable managers about 
HRM in the organization, this reduces problems associated with single respondent bias (Huselid and 
Becker 2000). Lastly, we asked each respondent to recall the incidence of each practice only for the 
preceding three years.  
  Table 1 shows the incidence of EI and FP practices amongst survey firms in 2002 and 2005. 
The incidence of EI indicates significant heterogeneity in the popularity of EI. For instance, in 2005 
the most common forms of EI are job rotation (84%), job satisfaction surveys (82%) and suggestion 
schemes (76%), whereas self-managed teams (35%) and board representation (12%) occur much less 
frequently. During this period there were also significant increases in the incidence of many 
practices--e.g. 62% of firms have joint consultation committees in 2002 but by 2005 the figure has 
jumped to 75%. 
  Between 2002 and 2005 the most popular form of FP is PRP. The incidence of PRP grew 
from 55% in 2002 to 68% in 2005. The incidence of personnel funds decreased slightly from 6% in 
2002 to 5% in 2005. Broad-based stock option schemes and broad-based share ownership schemes 
are rarely used. The percentage of firms without any form of FP decreased from 42% in 2002 to 31% 
in 2005.  
    [Table 1 about here] 
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 Company financial statement data are obtained from a firm that specializes in providing firm-
level data (including income statements and balance sheets) for 60-80,000 Finnish firms per year 
during 2002-2005. These data have been used in many previous empirical studies.  
Besides EI and FP, a rich literature finds that other factors are importantly related to firm 
performance. These include computer use (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000), foreign ownership (Aitken 
and Harrison 1999), family ownership (Bennedsen et al. 2007) and product market competition 
(Bloom and Van Reenen 2007). Our survey data enable us, mainly in cross-sectional empirical work, 
to control for these covariates.  
 
Empirical strategy 
  We estimate augmented Cobb-Douglas (CD) production functions since this is the practice in 
related literature, such as evaluating the productivity effects of EI (e.g. Zwick 2004) or stock options 
(e.g. Jones, Kalmi and Mäkinen 2010).  
  In the following empirical analysis, we use both cross sectional (2005) and panel-data (2002-
2005). Cross-section estimates are subject to omitted variable bias caused by unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. For instance, a firm with an innovative corporate culture and history is more likely 
than the average firm to adopt new HRM practices such as FP and EI. Thus cross-section estimates 
of the productivity effect of FP and EI may capture not only the productivity effect of FP and EI, but 
also the productivity effect of innovative corporate culture, resulting in the overestimation of the 
productivity effect of FP and EI. By contrast, fixed effect estimates exploit the fact that some 
unobserved firm heterogeneity such as corporate culture is often time-invariant in the short term, and 
allow for the removal of such unobserved yet time-invariant confounders. However fixed-effect 
estimates may not always be preferred over cross-section estimates, especially if key variables of 
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interest are measured with error or change only slowly. Hence, we report both cross-section and 
fixed effect estimates, while discussing the limitations of each approach.   
A key feature of our empirical strategy is to estimate various specifications reflecting three 
approaches concerning the appropriate way to capture the effect of EI and FP practices on 
production. In implementing the first method, the additive scale approach, we begin with a cross 
section model that uses a simple count of EI and/or FP practices. The model provides the “direct 
effect” estimates of EI and FP and a comparison to the “complementarity effect” estimates of EI and 
FP. The augmented cross-sectional Cobb-Douglas production function is:  
(1) ln(Y/L)i = c + ln(K/L)i + ln(M/L)i + Xi +FP4i  + EI7i + i, 
where for firm i, ln(Y/L)i is the natural logarithm of firm sales per worker (labor productivity), c is a 
constant term, ln(K/L)i is the capital labor ratio (capital is the sum of tangible and intangible assets at 
the end of a given year), ln(M/L)i is intermediate inputs per worker (materials), and i is an error term 
assumed to be independently and identically distributed.   
This “Additive Scale Approach” has been used widely, including Freeman and Kleiner 
(2000). Specifically, FP4i is the number of FP practices in use by firm i. We consider four specific 
practices: (i) PRP; (ii) personnel fund; (iii) broad-based stock option scheme; and (iv) broad-based 
share ownership scheme, and hence FP4i takes a value between 0 and 4. Likewise, EI7i is the number 
of EI programs in firm i, and we consider seven programs: (i) joint consultation committee; (ii) 
quality circles; (iii) self-managed teams; (iv) board representation; (v)  job rotation; (vi) suggestion 
scheme;  and (vii) job satisfaction survey9. EI7i takes a value between 0 and 7.  
Xi  is a vector of firm characteristics and other controls for firm i, specifically: ln (age of firm) 
and ln(age)2; share of employees using computers almost daily in their work; share of employee 
                                                 
9 By including job satisfaction as an indicator of EI we draw on previous findings for the US (e.g. Jones, Kato and 
Weinberg, 2003) as well as for Finland (e.g. Kalmi and Kauhanen, 2008). Also in regressions, when we removed this 
component of EI from the EI indices, results were essentially unaffected. 
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training; and union density; and dummy variables indicating 10 different regions; 9 two-digit 
manufacturing industry classifications; foreign majority owner; publicly listed firm;  multi-plant 
firm; family ownership (membership in the Finnish Family Firms Association); intensive product 
market competition. Using this unusually comprehensive set of controls reduces the usual concern 
over omitted variable bias, in particular for cross-section estimates. Note that when we use panel data 
and estimate fixed effect models, some controls are excluded (some are time-invariant and thus 
absorbed by firm fixed effects) and some data are available only for 2005. Finally all value variables 
are deflated to constant 2000 Euros using the CPI deflator. Table 2 presents summary company 
statistics for panel data during 2002-2005 and for cross-sectional data in 2005. 
    (Table 2 about here) 
 To test complementarity between FP and EI, we augment Eq. (1) with the interaction term 
involving FP4i and EI7i and estimate:  
(2) ln(Y/L)i = c + ln(K/L)i + ln(M/L)i + Xi +FP4i  + EI7i  
+γFP4i *EI7i + i, 
A positive sign of  (the coefficient on the interaction term) indicates positive complementarity 
between EI7 and FP4.  
 To implement the second “EI focus approach”, different combinations of the seven EI 
practices are constructed. The key idea is that different forms of EI may differ in their function and 
intensity and therefore have different implications for organizational performance (e.g. Ben-Ner and 
Jones 1995). In particular, representative forms of EI are more likely to give employees voice in 
company strategic decision-making, whereas direct participation methods mainly relate to work 
process. The former are expected to have a stronger association with firm-level aggregate 
performance, and possibly produce a stronger complementarity with FP (Robinson and Wilson 
2006). In turn, direct participation can differ considerably in intensity-- quality circles and 
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autonomous teams are more powerful organizational practices than others such as suggestion 
schemes. Therefore, we create three dummy variables: EI_REP, the count of joint consultation 
committee and board representation (a value between 0 and 2); EI_STRONG (stronger forms of EI, 
where employees get to make decisions) the count of quality circles and self-managed teams (also a 
value between 0 and 2); and EI_WEAK (weaker forms of EI, where employees are limited to 
expressing a view) the count of job rotation10, suggestion scheme, and job satisfaction survey (a 
value between 0 and 3). Thus, we estimate: 
(3) ln(Y/L)i = c + ln(K/L)i + ln(M/L)i + Xi +FP4i 
  + EI_REPi + EI_STRONGi + EI_WEAKi + i. 
 To explore complementarities, we estimate:   
(4) ln(Y/L)i= c + ln(K/L)i + ln(M/L)i + Xi +FP4i  
+ EI_REPi + EI_STRONGi + EI_WEAKi +  
+FP4i*EI_REPi + FP4i*EI_STRONGi + FP4i*EI_WEAKi + i. 
 Since using a full set of EIs and FPs and their interactive terms may cause substantial 
efficiency losses, our third approach is to construct hierarchical categories of HRM systems (see, 
e.g., Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi 1997). Here individual EI and FP practices are mapped into 
ordered categories of HRM systems, from the ‘most elementary’, TRADITIONAL, to the ‘most 
innovative’ system, EIFPFULL (see Table 3).11   
[Table 3 around here] 
Thus, we estimate:  
(5) ln(Y/L)i = c + ln(K/L)i + ln(M/L)i + Xi +
 EIFPFULLi  +  EIFPPARTi  +  EIONLY1i  +  EIONLY2i  + i. 
                                                 
10 We recognize that job rotation may be viewed as a relatively strong form of EI, so we re-estimated the regressions by 
assigning job rotation in EI_STRONG: reassuringly we found no discernible change in the results. 
11 While it would be conceptually possible to include another FPONLY row we do not do so because essentially this 
would be an empirically empty category. For example in 2005 FPONLY = 0 while in 2004 FPONLY =1. 
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  Examining descriptive data on HRM systems during 2002-2005 (Table 4) show the most 
participatory EIFPFULL increasing (29% of firms in 2002, 42% in 2005). The share of firms with 
EIFPPART remained stable. However, the share of firms with HRM Systems that cannot exploit the 
potential complementarities between EI and FP (EIONLY1, EIONLY2 and TRADITIONAL) 
decreased.  
  Consistent with positive complementarities between EI and FP, Table 4 shows that the most 
advanced HRM Systems EIFPFULL and EIFPPART (where firms can exploit potential 
complementarities) exhibit the greatest average productivity. Using an exponential transformation, in 
2005 average labor productivity is about 178,000 euros (per worker) in firms with HRM Systems 
EIFPFULL or EIFPPART and close to 110,000 euros (per worker) in firms with TRADITIONAL. 
Before accepting this finding, however, we need to control for other factors that may explain 
variation in average labor productivity across firms.  
   [Table 4 about here]   
Last we provide some evidence on the hypothesis that changes on the intensive margin may 
be more important than changes on the extensive margin. Our data allow us to consider the 
proportion of white-collar workers covered by PRP and the proportion of blue-collar workers 
covered by PRP, and thereby estimate the productivity effect of the scope of PRP (intensive margin) 
as opposed to the incidence of PRP (extensive margin) for the 2005 cross-section.12   
(6)  ln(Y/L)i = c + ln(K/L)i + ln(M/L)i + Xi +PWCi  +PBCi  + EI7i + i, 
where, in firm i, PWCi=proportion of white-collar workers covered by PRP and PBCi=proportion of 
blue-collar workers covered by PRP. The mean and s.d. for PWCi and PBCi are 54.08 (47.23) and 
54.07 (48.71), respectively. To investigate complementarity between PRP gauged by this alternative 
measure and EI, we augment Eq. (6) with the relevant interaction terms: 
                                                 
12 Similar data on the intensive margin for EI (e.g., the proportion of workers covered or participating in an EI program) 
are unavailable;  therefore we focus on PRP and the intensive margin.  
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(7)  ln(Y/L)i = c + ln(K/L)i + ln(M/L)i + Xi +PWCi  +PBCi  + EI7i  
+PWCi *EI7i +PBCi *EI7i + i, 
Another feature that defines our empirical strategy reflects our having panel data on EI and 
FP practices. Therefore, for all models (except for Equations (6) and (7)), we can directly apply the 
fixed effects estimator  to assess the association of EI and FP practices with firm performance, while 
simultaneously controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across firms.  
  
Empirical findings 
Cross section 2005  
  Table 5 reports cross sectional findings for 2005. We report in that table findings that are 
based on the M-estimator (-rreg- in Stata®) that is more robust to vertical outliers13 than the OLS 
estimator14.   In column (1) we use the additive scale approach to assess the direct effects of overall 
EI and FP and find that EI7 is insignificant, but FP4 is positively significant (0.03) at the 10% level 
However, when we include the interaction term involving EI7 and FP4 the estimated coefficient is 
statistically insignificant—there is no evidence for synergy between EI and FP. Also the coefficient 
of FP4 is statistically insignificant in column (2). 
  Columns (3) and (4) report findings based on the second approach -- measures of EI reflect 
different foci of practices: representative, weaker and stronger forms of EI. In column (3), 
representative EI is positively significant (.051) at the 1% level and FP is also positively significant 
(.033) at the 10 percent level. Column (4) looks at potential complementarities between EI and FP. 
The estimated coefficient on the interaction term involving representative forms of EI and FP is 
                                                 
13 The residuals of 24 observations in column (1) have studentized residuals that exceed +2 or -2, a common cutoff for 
points of concern.   
14 OLS results are available upon request. 
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positively significant (0.087) at the 1% level, suggesting that FP and representative EI complement 
each other in boosting productivity.   
 [Table 5 about here] 
Table 6 reports cross sectional estimates for 2005 for our continuous PRP variable 
specification (equations (6) and (7)). To deal with outlying observations, we continue to use the M-
estimator. In the baseline model, (column (1)), the estimated coefficient on PWC is positive and 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level, indicating that a firm with a higher proportion of 
white-collar workers covered by PRP is, on average, more productive than other firms. In other 
words, there is a positive association between the breadth of PRP as applied to white-collar workers 
and enterprise productivity. More importantly, as shown in column (2), when augmented with 
interaction terms involving the continuous variable of PRP (one for white-collar and the other for 
blue-collar workers) and EI, we find evidence for complementarity between PRP and EI—for white-
collar workers (PWC) the estimated coefficient on EI7 (our EI variable) and the breadth of PRP is 
positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. While no similar results are found for the 
proportion of blue-collar workers covered by PRP, the literature on the high-performance work 
system (HPWS) suggests that the systems characterized by EI and FP works well when workers 
engage in complex jobs (e.g. Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw, 2007). Arguably white-collar jobs are 
less routine and more complex than blue-collar jobs. As such, our result is consistent with the finding 
in the HPWS literature that employees differ in their expectations and desires regarding participation and 
EI whereby, compared to blue collar workers, white collar workers may respond more positively to 
greater EI and FP.  
  In sum, our cross-sectional estimates inform us that the way in which the effect of 
complementarities is captured matters. Insofar as the incidence of EI and FP (extensive margin) is 
concerned, there is little evidence in support of complementarities between EI and FP. But when we 
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further disaggregate EI into different types, we find evidence for complementarity between 
representative EI and FP. In addition, when using continuous measures of PRP (an important 
component of FP), we find evidence in support of complementarities for white-collar workers. As 
such, our cross-section estimates support our second hypothesis on the stronger potential impact of 
practices that enhance the intensive vs the extensive margin in CMEs.  
    [Table 6 about here] 
 Panel data 2002-2005  
  The retrospective nature of our survey allows us to utilize information on changes in the use 
of EI and FP practices (and HRM systems) among sample firms during 2002-2005. As such, we can 
estimate fixed effect models and eliminate possible omitted variable bias caused by unobserved fixed 
cofounders, such as managerial quality (the extent to which this is stable during 2002-2005).  
Table 7 shows how firms’ overall use of EI7 and FP is related to firm productivity. In column 
(1), where we use the pooled OLS for a comparison with the fixed effects estimator, we find a 
significant association (0.049) between FP and firm productivity at the 1% level, while the 
coefficient of EI7 is statistically insignificant. Since there is likely to be a great deal of unobserved 
heterogeneity across sample firms, in columns (2)-(3) we use the fixed effects estimator. In column 
(2)17 FP is positive but insignificant (0.019), while we find a significant and negative association (-
0.020) between EI7 and firm productivity at the 1% level. This adverse effect on productivity is 
consistent with our hypothesis that, in a highly collaborative and trust-intensive environment, the 
cost of introducing a new practice may exceed its productivity gain, and result in a fall in value 
added.18 In column (3), to look at complementarities between EI7 and FP, an interaction term is 
                                                 
17 Most firm characteristics such as publicly listed (0/1), multiplant (0/1), foreign majority ownership (0/1), 10 region 
dummies and 9 two-digit manufacturing industry dummies are time-invariant over the time period under study (2002-
2005), and thereby drop from the fixed effect estimations.  
18 Such initial productivity losses following the introduction of a new HRM practice have been previously documented, 
e.g. Jones and Kato (1995). 
19 
 
included. Though EI7 remains negatively significant (-0.020) at the 1% level, we find no evidence of 
complementarities.19  
[Table 7 about here] 
   Table 8 shows how firms’ representative, weaker and stronger forms of EI, and FP are 
associated with firm productivity. In column (1), where we use the pooled OLS for a comparison 
with the fixed effects estimates, the estimated FP coefficient (0.046) is statistically significant at the 
1% level while of the three subgroups of EI, only the coefficient of representative EI is significant 
(0.033). The three subgroups of EI are jointly significant at the 10% level and participatory practices 
(EIs and FP) are jointly significant at the 1% level. In columns (2)-(3) we use the fixed effects 
estimator. In column (2), only the coefficient of weaker forms of EI (-0.049) is significant at the 1% 
level. In column (3) we focus on complementarities among the three subgroups of EI (i.e. REP 
(representative), WEAK (weaker) and STRONG (stronger) forms and FP. We continue to find that 
the coefficient of weaker forms of EI (-0.032) is statistically significant but only at the 10% level. 
We also find that the estimated coefficient of FP (0.081) is significant at 10% level. Again, however, 
we find no evidence of complementarities.20  
     [Table 8 about here] 
  Table 9 provides evidence on complementarities using the HRM systems approach. Note that 
only advanced participatory systems EIFPFULL and EIFPPART can exploit complementarities 
between EI and FP since other systems (EIONLY1, EIONLY2) exclude FP practices. The reference 
category is the most elementary TRADITIONAL. In column (1) the robust M-estimator provides 
                                                 
19 Since the importance of participatory practices might differ between low and high productivity firms, in unreported 
regressions we split our sample into low and high productivity firms using the sample median of labor productivity as a 
cutoff. We continue to find no evidence of complementarities. We also split our sample into small and large firms using 
the sample median of employment and continue to find no evidence of complementarities. Also EI7 and FP are 
statistically insignificant. Unreported regressions are available upon request. 
20In unreported regressions we split our sample into low and high productivity firms by using the sample median of labor 
productivity. We continue to find no evidence of complementarities. Among individual EI practices, only for high 
productivity firms is the coefficient of the weaker forms of EI negatively significant. 
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HRM system estimates using a cross section for 2005 and a broad set of firm controls (similar to 
those used earlier and reported in Table 5). We find no statistically significant coefficients on any 
system variable, suggesting that the firm with more innovative HRM practices is no more or less 
productive than the firm without these practices. As a robustness check, we estimate column (1) 
using broad-based FP only (i.e. PRP is replaced with broad-based PRP in FP), and find little change 
in the results (not reported here but available upon request). In column (2) we use a pooled OLS 
approach. The estimated coefficient of EIFPFULL is positive (.039) but insignificant. In contrast, the 
coefficient of EIFPPART is positive and significant (.048) at the 10% level.  
To account for unobserved firm heterogeneity, we estimate fixed effect models and report the 
results in column (3) of Table 9. The coefficients on EIFPFULL and EIFPPART are not statistically 
significant even at the 10 percent level. As such, a switch from the traditional HRM system to an 
advanced system yields no significant productivity gain. Interestingly the estimated coefficient on 
EIONLY2 is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that adopting 
stronger forms of EI without introducing FP results in an 8 percent productivity loss.  
In sum panel data methods yield next to no evidence in support of complementarities. As 
such these findings provide strong support for our hypothesis that complementarities will be weaker 
in CMEs than in LMEs. This result is found for all three ways used to capture the impact of EI and 
FP and when categorical measures of EI and FP are used.  
  Finally while providing no evidence for EI-FP complementarities, our panel data analysis 
provides evidence for the negative productivity effect of EI. Though the majority of prior studies on 
EI find either positive or no productivity effect of EI, the finding of significant negative effects is 
rather unusual.  
 [Table 9 about here] 
Conclusions 
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 Between 2002 and 2005, the incidence of FP and EI practices grew in Finnish 
manufacturing. The spread of more participatory HRM systems and “shared capitalism” are largely 
consistent with changes observed in other institutional environments (e.g. Kruse, Freeman and Blasi, 
2010 for the US). At the same time, we find substantial heterogeneity in the presence of EI and FP 
practices across firms including substantial growth in the use of such practices in tandem. To explore 
potential complementary benefits between EI and FP, we gather new representative survey data 
covering diverse practices. 
  Previous empirical work in this area is limited both in scope and nature, and has produced 
rather contradictory results. However most previous research has focused on either US or UK cases, 
“liberal market economies”; very little work has been undertaken for “coordinated market 
economies” (Godard 2004). We hypothesize that in a CME such as Finland with strong traditions of 
employee participation and industrial democracy, complementarities can be expected to be 
significantly weaker than in LMEs. We also hypothesize that, in a mature participatory economy 
such as Finland, while changes in whether or not a certain program exists---the extensive margin--- 
may be ineffective, what may matter are changes in coverage or extent-- the intensive margin. By 
using detailed cross-sectional data we take into account the determinants of business performance 
that often have been omitted from studies of the effects of EI and FP (and so leads to possible 
omitted variable bias). At the same time, by using panel data we control for unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. We also note that the existing literature is characterized by using different methods to 
capture the potential impact of EI and FP (e.g. HRM systems vs summary indices). By investigating 
in a single study, diverse ways to capture complementarities and by using diverse estimators we also 
shed light on the potential role of those matters in accounting for variation in reported findings 
concerning complementarities.  
  Our findings are somewhat sensitive to estimating method. When we utilize within-firm 
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variations in the fixed effect models, we find next to no evidence for complementarities between EI 
and FP. However, when we focus on between-firm variations in cross-sectional estimations, we find 
evidence for complementarities. Even though fixed effect estimates are often considered more 
reliable than cross-section estimates (because they account for unobserved fixed confounders), in the 
context of our study we are somewhat agnostic about the supremacy of fixed-effect estimates. Our 
cross-section estimates are conditional on a set of controls that are more extensive than those 
contained in most prior studies, and hence are less susceptible to bias caused by unobserved 
confounders. Second, our panel may not be long enough to capture the lagged productivity effect of 
EI and FP.  
We also find that the way in which complementarities are captured bears on the pattern of 
findings. For example cross sectional estimates using the additive scale approach reveal no evidence 
of interactions between EI and FP whereas when we construct measures with different foci 
(reflecting representative, weaker and stronger forms of EI) we do find evidence of 
complementarities.  
When we focus on the incidence of EI and FP, typically we find evidence at best of weak 
complementarities—thus supporting our core hypothesis that institutional context matters. 
Specifically, in a country like Finland with a strong tradition of employee participation and industrial 
democracy, within-firm variations in EI and FP as measured by their incidence (as in our fixed effect 
estimations) may be expected to have little impact on productivity. Adding a new participatory 
practice to a well-established set of complementary practices is not expected to yield a strong 
complementary effect. At the outset, the firm may know which practices strongly complement each 
other and hence should comprise the initial bundle. Likewise, the firm excludes other practices from 
the initially bundled set because they were deemed to have little complementarity with the initially 
chosen set of practices. Hence, when what was initially an excluded practice is subsequently added, 
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it is unsurprising that a negligible complementary effect with FP will emerge. Indeed, in such an 
environment, the cost of introducing new practices may exceed productivity gains, and result in 
declining value added. 21   
We also provide evidence on our second hypothesis that, in an economy such as Finland, 
while changes in the extensive margin may be ineffective, changes on the intensive margin may be 
effective. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, we are unable to study changes on the intensive 
margin in the fixed effect framework and thus we have no definitive answer concerning the relative 
importance of the intensive margin and the extensive margin. However, by using the proportion of 
white-collar and blue-collar workers covered by PRP, we estimate the productivity effect of PRP on 
the intensive margin cross-sectionally and find results mostly consistent with this hypothesis. 
Specifically, the firm with a greater proportion of white-collar workers covered by PRP was more 
productive than other firms. Moreover, the positive productivity effect of the breadth of PRP was 
greater for firms with more EI programs---there is evidence of a complementarity between EI and 
PRP.  
We recognize that there are potential limitations in our study. Even though using longitudinal 
data is unusual, the data are retrospective and therefore prone to recall error, though we minimize 
this by keeping the period relatively short and interviewing the manager most knowledgeable about 
the subject. Also we have single respondents, which is good for the consistency of information, but 
may bias survey responses towards a managerial perspective. The EI practices and FP classes in this 
study, though broad, are not all-encompassing. The use of dummy variables, although consistent 
with our overall approach, may bias results if practices are not broad-based, and our tests of the 
second hypothesis concerning the intensive margin are limited by the available data ---data on the 
intensive margin are limited to FP and even intensive margin data on FP are available only cross-
                                                 
21 This argument is consistent with the design perspective in Bloom and van Reenen (2011).  
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sectionally. Despite the limitations inevitably present in survey studies, we believe our data have 
accurately captured the state of HRM practices in Finland and their impact on firm performance. One 
particular potentially important task for future research in the field is to extend the cross-section 
analysis of the productivity effect of PRP and EI on the intensive margin to panel-data analysis using 
a fixed effects estimator. It would be better still if comparable and comprehensive longitudinal data 
for a range of countries with differing styles of capitalism could be assembled and used to investigate 
more directly the issues we address in this paper. 
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Table 1. The incidence of seven EI and four FP practices in 2002 and 2005 
 
 2002 2005 
Employee involvement  
Board representation 
 
52 
(13.1%) 
 
46 
(11.6%) 
Joint consultation committee 246 
(61.8%) 
297 
(74.6%) 
Quality circle 182 
(45.7%) 
219 
(55.0%) 
Self-managed team 104 
(26.1%) 
138 
(34.7%) 
Job rotation 296 
(74.4%) 
333 
(83.7%) 
Suggestion scheme 270 
(67.8%) 
302 
(75.9%) 
Job satisfaction survey 325 
(81.7%) 
327 
(82.2%) 
Financial participation  
PRP 
 
220 
(55.3%) 
 
269 
(67.6%) 
Personnel fund 24 
(6.0%) 
21 
(5.3%) 
Broad-based stock option scheme 6 
(1.5%) 
4 
(1.0%) 
Broad-based share ownership  7 
(1.8%) 
6 
(1.5%) 
Notes: Altogether 398 firms fully participated in our HRM survey. Missing values are treated as a 
non-existence of practice. 
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Table 2. Summary firm statistics      
Variable Definition Obs.  Mean Std.dev.  
Panel data 2002-2005: key production variables  
Sales sales (€1000)  1,200 71,071     206,409 
Labor # employees  1,200 283.5 548.6 
Capital sum of intangible and tangible fixed assets 
(€1000) 
1,200 25,346 112,904 
Panel data 2002-2005: firm characteristics   
Foreign majority 
owner 
=1, the major owner is foreign in 2005, 0 
otherwise 
1,200 0.20 0.40 
Publicly listed =1,  firm publicly listed in 2005, 0 otherwise 1,200 0.07 0.25 
Firm age Age  1,200 16.6 12.4 
Multi-plant =1,  firm has more than one plant in 2005, 0 
otherwise 
1,200 0.54 0.50 
     
Cross-sectional data 2005: key production variables  
Sales sales (€1000)  301 78,891     220,297 
Labor # employees  301 286.8 553.2 
Capital sum of intangible and tangible fixed assets 
(€1000) 
301 26,228 121,826 
Cross-sectional data 2005: firm characteristics  
Computer use Share of employees using computers almost daily  301 0.57 0.29 
Foreign majority 
owner 
=1, major owner is foreign, 0 otherwise 301 0.21 0.41 
Family firm =1, firm is a member of the Finnish Family Firms 
Association, 0 otherwise 
301 0.11 0.32 
Multi-plant =1, firm has more than one plant, 0 otherwise 301 0.52 0.50 
Very hard 
competition 
=1,  product market competition scored 5 on the 
scale 1-5, 0 otherwise 
301 0.40 0.49 
Publicly listed =1,  firm publicly listed, 0 otherwise 301 0.06 0.23 
Firm age Age  301 16.2 11.0 
Union density Share of employees in union 301 0.84 0.16 
Training Share of employee received training 301 0.57 0.34 
Notes: Statistics are for observations used in estimations. Owing to missing firm characteristics and financial statements 
data the number of firms in 2005 (301) differs from the number of firms (398) that fully participated in the survey; 
similarly for the panel data for 2002-2005.   
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Table 3. Construction of HRM systems: 
 EI_Rep EI_Strong EI_Weak FP 
EIFPFULL=1 if At least one At least one At least one At least one 
EIFPPART=1 if At least one may or may not have one At least one 
EIONLY1=1 if At least one none At least one none 
EIONLY2=1 if none At least one At least one none 
TRADITIONAL=1 if none none may or may not have one none 
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Table 4. The HRM systems approach: incidence of HRM systems and average labor productivity  
 Incidence of HRM Systems  Average labor productivity 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2002 2003 2004 2005 
EIIFPFULL 
(“the most  
participatory 
system”) 
 
112 
(28.5%) 
 
126 
(32.1%) 
 
140 
(35.6%) 
 
163 
(41.5%) 
 
5.14 
(.60) 
 
5.13 
(.64) 
 
5.13 
(.58) 
 
5.17 
(.58) 
EIFPPART 
 
117 
(29.8%) 
113 
(28.8%) 
110 
(28.0%) 
112 
(28.5%) 
5.07 
(.74) 
5.11 
(.69) 
5.13 
(.65) 
5.19 
(.60) 
EIONLY1 
 
93 
(23.7%) 
 
93 
(23.7%) 
95 
(24.2%) 
 
82 (20.9%) 
 
4.82 
(.47) 
 
4.83 
(.46) 
4.85 
(.43) 
 
4.89 
(.47) 
 
EIONLY2 
 
21 (5.3%) 19 (4.8%) 15 (3.8%) 16 (4.1%) 4.83 
(.40) 
4.88 
(.36) 
4.90 
(.42) 
4.93 
(.37) 
TRADITIONAL 
(”the most  
elementary 
system”) 
47 
(12.0%) 
40 
(10.2%) 
32 (8.1%) 20 (5.1%) 4.77 
(.52)  
4.83 
(.57) 
4.90 
(.65) 
4.70 
(.60) 
N 393 393 393 393 207 207 207 207 
Notes: Average (real) labor productivity figures are in logs (ln(Y/L)).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
Table 5. Cross-section estimates of the productivity effect of EI and FP and their complementarities in 2005 
  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/*/ significant at 1/5/10% level. Firm controls=ln(firm age), ln(firm age)2, share of computer use, publicly listed (0/1), family firm (0/1), very hard product market 
competition (0/1), multiplant firm (0/1), foreign majority ownership (0/1), share of employee training and union density. All models include a constant term, 10 region dummies and 9 two-digit manufacturing 
industry dummies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) 
M-estimator  
(2) 
M-estimator  
(3) 
M-estimator  
(4) 
M-estimator  
Ln(K/L) 
 
0.042 *** 
(0.011) 
0.041 *** 
(0.011) 
0.041 *** 
(0.011) 
0.040 *** 
(0.011) 
Ln(M/L) 0.639 *** 
(0.015) 
0.639 *** 
(0.015) 
0.632 *** 
(0.015) 
0.633 *** 
(0.016) 
EI7 
(employee involvement) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
- 
 
- 
 
EI_REP 
(representative EI)  
- 
 
- 
 
0.051 *** 
(0.021) 
0.003 
(0.029) 
EI_WEAK 
(weaker EI) 
- 
 
- 
 
0.006 
(0.015) 
0.016 
(0.018) 
EI_STRONG 
(stronger EI) 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.011 
(0.015) 
-0.007  
(0.020) 
FP4_BROAD 
(broad-based financial participation)  
0.032 * 
(0.018) 
-0.003 
(0.056) 
0.033 * 
(0.019) 
0.023 
(0.067) 
EI7 x FP4_BROAD  0.008 
(0.013) 
  
EI_REP x FP4_BROAD  - - - 0.087 *** 
(0.034) 
EI_WEAK x FP4_BROAD - - - -0.029 
(0.025) 
EI_STRONG x FP4_BROAD  - - -  0.000 
(0.025) 
Obs.  301 301 301 301 
Adjusted R2 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 
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Table 6. Cross-section estimates of the productivity effect of EI and FP in 2005: using the proportion of white-collar and blue-collar 
workers covered by PRP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/*/ significant at 1/5/10% level. Firm controls=ln(firm age), ln(firm age)2, share of computer use, publicly listed (0/1), family firm (0/1), very hard product market 
competition (0/1), multiplant firm (0/1), foreign majority ownership (0/1), share of employee training and union density. All models also include a constant term, 10 region dummies and 9 two-digit 
manufacturing industry dummies.  
  
 (1) 
M-estimator 
(2) 
M-estimator  
Ln(K/L) 
 
0.043*** 
(0.011) 
0.042*** 
(0.011) 
Ln(M/L) 0.633*** 
(0.015) 
0.633*** 
(0.015) 
PWC 0.0006* 
(0.0003) 
-0.0011 
(0.0010) 
PBC -0.0000 
(0.0003) 
0.0011 
(0.0010) 
EI7 
(employee involvement)  
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.0009 
(0.0116) 
PWC x EI7   0.0004* 
(0.0002) 
PBC x EI7  -0.0003 
(0.0002) 
Obs.  299 299 
Adjusted R2 0.914 0.916 
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Table 7. Panel data estimates of the productivity effect of EI and FP during 2002-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Firm-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/*/  significant at 1/5/10% level. In column (1) controls include a constant term, ln(firm age), ln(firm age)2, publicly listed (0/1), multiplant 
(0/1), foreign majority ownership (0/1),  year dummies, 10 region dummies and 9 two-digit manufacturing industry dummies. In columns (2)-(5) controls include a constant term, ln(firm age), ln(firm age)2, and 
year dummies. POLS=the pooled OLS estimator. FE= the fixed effect estimator.   
 (1) 
POLS 
2002-2005 
(2)  
FE 
2002-2005 
(3) 
FE 
2002-2005 
Ln(K/L) 
 
0.041 *** 
(0.014) 
0.046 
(0.040) 
0.046 
(0.040) 
Ln(M/L) 0.630 *** 
(0.022) 
0.679 *** 
(0.085) 
0.679 *** 
(0.085) 
EI7 
(employee involvement) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.020 *** 
(0.007) 
-0.020 *** 
(0.007) 
FP4  
(financial participation)  
0.049 *** 
(0.017) 
0.019 
(0.016) 
0.020  
(0.035) 
EI7 x FP4 
(H0: “no complementarities”)  
- - -0.000 
(0.008) 
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Obs. 1,200 1,200 1,200 
Firms  358 358 358 
Adjusted R2 0.89 0.67 0.67 
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Table 8. Panel data estimates of the productivity effect of EI and FP during 2002-2005: using disaggregated measures of EI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Firm-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/*/  significant at 1/5/10% level. In column (1) controls include a constant term, ln(firm age), ln(firm age)2, publicly listed (0/1), multiplant 
(0/1), foreign majority ownership (0/1),  year dummies, 10 region dummies and 9 two-digit manufacturing industry dummies. In columns (2)-(5) controls include a constant term, ln(firm age), ln(firm age)2, and 
year dummies. POLS=the pooled OLS estimator. FE= the fixed effect estimator.  
  
 (1) 
POLS 
2002-2005 
(2) 
FE 
2002-2005 
(3) 
FE 
2002-2005  
Ln(K/L) 
 
0.039 *** 
(0.013) 
0.049 
(0.039) 
0.049  
(0.039) 
Ln(M/L) 0.629 *** 
(0.022) 
0.676 *** 
(0.084) 
0.675 *** 
(0.083) 
EI_STRONG  
(stronger EI) 
-0.017 
(0.013) 
0.014 
(0.013) 
-0.003 
(0.015) 
EI_REP 
(representative EI)  
0.033 *  
(0.018) 
-0.021  
(0.018) 
-0.017  
(0.021) 
EI_WEAK  
(weaker EI) 
-0.016 
(0.011) 
-0.049 *** 
(0.016) 
-0.032 **  
(0.014) 
FP4  
(financial participation)  
0.046 *** 
(0.018) 
0.020 
(0.016) 
0.081 * 
(0.045) 
EI_REP x  FP4  - - -0.007 
(0.019) 
EI_WEAK x FP4  - - -0.029 
(0.018) 
EI_STRONG x FP4  - - 0.023 
(0.016) 
F-test: three interaction terms jointly=0 (p-value); “H0: 
no complementarities between EI&FP” 
- - 1.38 
(0.250) 
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Obs. 1,200 1,200 1,200 
Firms  358 358 358 
Adjusted R2 0.89 0.67 0.68 
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Table 9. Cross-section and panel estimates of the productivity effect of EI and FP: using a system approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Firm-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/*/ significant at 1/5/10% level. In column (1) controls include a constant term, ln(firm age), ln(firm age)2, share of computer use, publicly 
listed (0/1), family firm (0/1), very hard product market competition (0/1), multiplant firm (0/1), foreign majority ownership (0/1), share of employee training, union density, 10 region dummies and 9 two-digit 
manufacturing industry dummies. In column (2) controls include a constant term, ln(firm age), ln(firm age)2, publicly listed (0/1), multiplant (0/1), foreign majority ownership (0/1),  year dummies, 10 region 
dummies and 9 two-digit manufacturing industry dummies. In column (3) controls include ln(firm age), ln(firm age)2, and year dummies. POLS=the pooled OLS estimator. FE=the fixed effects estimator. 
 (1) 
M-estimator 
2005 
(2) 
POLS 
2002-2005 
(3) 
FE 
2002-2005 
Ln(K/L) 
 
0.034 *** 
(0.011) 
0.041 *** 
(0.014) 
0.045  
(0.041) 
Ln(M/L) 0.638 *** 
(0.016) 
0.627 *** 
(0.022) 
0.679 *** 
(0.086) 
EIFPFULL 0.042  
(0.047) 
0.039  
(0.029) 
-0.001  
(0.033) 
EIFPPART 0.021 
(0.048) 
0.048 * 
(0.026) 
0.003  
(0.029) 
EIONLY1 -0.048 
(0.049) 
-0.021 
(0.028) 
-0.034  
(0.023) 
EIONLY2 0.044 
(0.073) 
-0.007 
(0.034) 
-0.079 *** 
(0.023) 
Obs. 287 1,200 1,200 
Firms  287 358 358 
Adjusted R2 0.91 0.89 0.67 
